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Customs Law
MATTHEW T. McGRATH, LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AND ROBERT A. SHAPIRO*
In 1997, the U.S. Customs Service (Customs), which is responsible for the administration
of most of the U.S. laws affecting imports and exports, continued its slow march toward the
full implementation of the Customs Modernization Act (Mod Act).' The agency published
several Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) and several drafts of proposed rules, but
only two final rules were promulgated. The final rules published by Customs have little general
applicability, dealing with a narrow area of the marking rules for country of origin2 and the
rules governing duty-free stores.' On the other hand, the subjects contained in the NPRMs
and the draft rules involve significant issues. The Department of Commerce also published its
final regulations implementing the Antidumping Code as enacted through the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act.4
In the judicial arena, the U.S. Court of International Trade and the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit issued several important decisions concerning administrative protests,
penalties, retroactivity, and the constitutionality of the Harbor Maintenance Tax.
1. Regulatory Developments
A. RECORDKEEPING
In April, Customs published proposed recordkeeping regulations5 that are, arguably, the
cornerstone to Customs' Mod Act implementation efforts. These regulations emphasize that
Customs' "paperless" entry processing environment does not relieve an importer or other
designated recordkeepers from maintaining records for later review, and clearly shift this burden
to the importer.
*Matthew T. McGrath and Lawrence M. Friedman are partners, and Robert A. Shapiro is an associate, in
the law firm of Barnes, Richardson & Colbum in Washington, D.C.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (NAFTA), Pub. L. No. 103-182 tit. VI,
107 Stat. 2057 (1993).
2. Country of Origin Marking, 62 Fed. Reg. 44,211 (1997).
3. General Policy, 62 Fed. Reg. 15,831 (1997).
4. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
5. Recordkeeping Requirements, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,704 (1997) (proposed April 23, 1997).
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The proposed rules expand the definition of parties subject to Customs recordkeeping over-
sight to include anyone who files an entry or declaration, transports or stores merchandise
carried or held under bond, causes the transportation or storage of bonded merchandise, files
a drawback claim, or causes an importation. 6 Additionally, both "entry records," commonly
referred to as the "(a)(l)(A)" records,7 and other ordinary business records that may pertain
to customs activities must be maintained.!
Administrative penalties of between 510,000 and $100,000 per release of merchandise may
be assessed for failure to produce records on reasonable demand by Customs within a reasonable
time.' Reasonableness is based on the number, type, and age of the items requested. The
regulations contain guidelines as to reasonable time periods for record production.'0 If the
demanded records relate to the eligibility of the importation for special duty treatment, Customs
may liquidate or reliquidate the entry at the higher duty rate." The recordkeeper may avoid
penalties by showing that the requested records had already been presented to and retained by
Customs 2 or by participating in the Customs Sanctioned Recordkeeping Compliance Program. "
Generally, records must be maintained in the format in which they are received.' Alternative
storage formats will be approved if the responsible party meets certain minimum standards
including the designation of two recordkeeping officers; the preparation of written procedures,
including an audit trail, for the transfer of the records; and the quarterly testing of the alternative
formats. Original records must be maintained for one year after the transfer to alternative
storage.' 5
B. DUTY DRAwBACK
Customs proposed changes to its duty drawback regulations in order to implement the Mod
Act provisions, increase the clarity of this regulatory section, expedite filing and processing of
drawback claims, and ensure that Customs has the necessary enforcement information to main-
tain effective administrative oversight.' 6 Several general principles are enumerated in the pro-
posed regulations. Acceptable accounting methods for the direct identification of merchandise,
when required, are itemized and include: first-in, first-out (FIFO); last-in, first-out (LIFO);
low-to-high; average; and inventory turnover." The regulations also recognize the use of agents
in the manufacturing process" and allow for the transfer of drawback rights to successor
companies."
6. Id. at 19,710 (proposed to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 163.2).
7. Section "(aXI)(A)" refers to the statutory provision which requires that the applicable party shall keep,
and render for examination, records which "pertain to any such activity, or to the information contained in the
records required by this chapter in connection with any such activity." 19 U.S.C.A. § 1508(a)(l)(A) (West Supp.
1998). A list of (aXIXA) records is included in the appendix to the proposed rules.
8. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1509 (West Supp. 1998).
9. Recordkeeping Requirements, 62 Fed. Reg. at 19,712 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 163.1).
10. Id. at 19,712 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 163.6).
I1. Notwithstanding the time limitations of sections 1514 and 1520, Customs may reliquidate these entries
up to two years after the original liquidation. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1509(g)(2XC)(ii) (West Supp. 1998).
12. Recordkeeping Requirements, supra note 9, at 19,712 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 163.6).
13. Id. at 19,712 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 163.14).
14. Id. at 19,711 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 163.5).
1S. Id.
16. Drawback Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 3,082 (1997).
17. Id. at 3,103. Other methodologies may also be used with Customs approval.
18. Id. at 3,101 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 191.9).
19. Id. at 3,104 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 191.22(d)).
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The proposed regulations reflect the Mod Act's change from "same condition" to "unused
merchandise" drawback,2" and the corresponding change from "fungibility" to "commercial
interchangeability" as a standard for substitution under this provision. 2' Customs did not define
commercial interchangeability beyond what was included in the legislative history.2 The pro-
posal defines "use" as the employment of the item to perform the function for which it was
intended, excluding any operation performed on the object not amounting to manufacture or
production.2
The proposal also implements a drawback compliance program that may reduce the potential
liability for penalty of its participants.24 A key part of the compliance program is the maintenance
and production of records required to prove fulfillment of the various statutory elements of
drawback. Drawback records are required to be kept until at least three years after the date
of payment of the related claim. 5 Customs urges exporters to keep their drawback records at
least until the liquidation of the drawback claim becomes final.26
The proposal makes the Exporters Summary Procedure available to all claimants rather than
granting it as a privilege. In addition, Customs has found that, under the current regulations,
the waiver of prior notice of exportation with intent to claim drawback has created significant
internal control weaknesses for the agency, so the proposal restricts this procedure to a single
use privilege. 7
The use of accelerated payment of drawback would also be restricted under this proposal.
The application to participate in this program will require the claimant to provide significantly
more information, and before approval, Customs will closely examine the applicant's record
for any unresolved Customs claims, inaccuracies in past claims, and prior instances of noncompli-
28
ance.
This year, Customs also issued a draft proposal for drawback penalty regulations.29 The
draft follows the statute in assessing penalties up to three times the loss of customs revenue
for fraudulent violations of the drawback laws.'" The penalties for negligent violations are
graduated depending on the record of the daimant" and are reduced for participants in the
20. See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (NAFTA), Pub. L. No. 103-182, tit.
VI, § 632, 107 Star. 20Y7 (1993).
21. 19 U.S.C.A. § 131 3(j)(2) (West Supp. 1998). The prior law would only permit drawback ifa "fungible,"
i.e., identical, item were substituted for the imported good.
22. Compare H.R. Rep. No. 103-361, pt. I at 131 with Drawback Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 3,107 (1997)
(to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 191.32(c)).
23. Drawback Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. at 3,107.
24. Id. at 3,123 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 191.191). Regulations regarding penalties for the filing of
false drawback claims were published in draft form this year. See Department of the Treasury, United States Custom
Service, Drawback (visited Apr. 7, 1998) <http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/hot-new/fed-reg/notices/draw-
pen.htm >.
25. See, e.g., Drawback Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. at 3,106 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 191. 2 5(g)).
26. Id. at 3,902. See also HRL 227217 (Apr. 7, 1997) (unliquidated drawback claim denied more than three
years after payment because supporting documentation was insufficient).
27. Drawback Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. at 3,108-3,109 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 191.36).
28. Id. at 3114 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 191.92).
29. See Department of the Treasury, United States Custom Service: Drawback (visited April 28, 1997) < http://
www.customs.ustreas.gov/hot-new/ fed-reg/notices/drawpen.htm >.
30. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1593a (West Supp. 1998).
31. Penalties of 20 percent of the lost tariff revenue for the first violation, 50 percent for first repeat violation,
and 100 percent of the lost revenue for second and subsequent repetitive violations. 19 U.S.C.A. § 159 3a(c)(2)(B)
(West Supp. 1998).
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drawback compliance program." Additionally, Customs will only examine the prior three years
to determine whether a compliance program participant has previously committed the same
negligent violation. Such temporal limitation is not available for those who do not participate
in the compliance program.
C. REASONABLE CARE
Customs released a checklist to which importers should refer in determining whether their
activities meet the reasonable care standard contained in the Mod Act." The checklist is broad,
and it is not expected that all questions will be applicable to all parties. Additionally, Customs
intends that this checklist will be updated to suit the changing nature of international trade.
The checklist acknowledges the role of experts in providing advice to importers and stresses
that reasonable care must be used in selecting an expert. The term "expert" is not further
defined by Customs in the checklist. In response to public comments, however, Customs stated
that choosing a customs lawyer or licensed broker as an expert makes compliance easier.34
D. WEEKLY ENTRY PROCEDURES FOR FOREIGN TRADE ZONES
Customs announced a proposal to allow weekly entries of merchandise withdrawn from
non-manufacturing foreign trade zones (FTZs). 5 A similar provision has been in existence for
manufacturing FTZs since 1986.34 As goods are often withdrawn from FTZs on a daily basis,
this proposal could greatly reduce the number of entries filed. Additionally, as the merchandise
processing fee is calculated and limited on a per entry basis, this proposal could result in significant
savings for the FTZ operator. Participation in the program is subject to an application approval
process.
E. ENTRY DATA RECONCILIATION PROTOTYPE
Section 637 of the Mod Act amended section 484 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to establish
a new subsection (b) entitled "reconciliation.1'3 7 In a September 30, 1997 notice, Customs
announced a prototype reconciliation system and stated that it will be the sole means for
reconciling an entry with respect to: (1) value, (2) classification, (3) merchandise entered under
32. Customs proposes that the first non-repetitive violation will be subject to a warning letter. For repetitive
violations the penalties are: 20 percent loss of revenue for the first violation, 50 percent for the second, and 100
percent for the third and any subsequent violations. Id.
33. Reasonable Care Checklist, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,248 (1997). The importer of record is required to use
"reasonable care" in the declaration of value, classification, applicable rate of duty and such other information
as will enable Customs to properly assess duties, collect accurate statistics and determine whether all other applicable
legal requirements are met. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1481 (West Supp. 1998).
34. Reasonable Care Checklist, 62 Fed. Reg. at 64,248. Ironically, the response to public comments also
notes that the selection and qualifications of the expert are "part and parcel" of the agency's determination as
to whether the party exercised reasonable care, but this information is also not included in the checklist. Id.
35. Weekly Entry Procedure for Foreign Trade Zones, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,129 (1997).
36. See 19 C.F.R. § 146.63(c)(1) (1997).
37. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1484(b) (West Supp. 1998).
The term 'reconciliation' means an electronic process, initiated at the request of an importer,
under which the elements of an entry, other than those elements related to the admissibility of
the merchandise, that are undetermined at the time of entry summary are provided to the
Customs Service at a later time. A reconciliation is treated as an entry for purposes of liquidation,
reliquidation, and protest.
19 U.S.C.A. § 1401(s) (West Supp. 1998).
VOL. 32, NO. 2
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, DISPUTES, AND REGULATION 263
Heading 9802 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (known generally as
"American goods returned"), or (4) merchandise entered under the North American Free Trade
Agreement. The prototype requires the importer to flag each entry at the time of filing and
indicate the issue for which a later reconciliation (to provide data not fully available at the
time of entry) will be filed. Customs may then liquidate the entry with respect to all issues
not covered by the reconciliation. The prototype is scheduled to begin no earlier than October
1, 1998 and run for approximately two years.
F. ITA PUBLICATION OF FINAL ANTIDUMPING REGULATIONS
On May 19, 1997, the International Trade Administration (ITA) of the Department of
Commerce published its final rules on antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) pro-
ceedings to conform to the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA).'5 The new rules do
not alter the ITA's practice or vary considerably from the interim rules issued on May 11,
1995. Rather, they tend to codify elements of the practice that have become consistent over
time. Certain changes, however, merit special note.
With regard to the revocation of outstanding AD orders, ITA may revoke an order if a
respondent can show an absence of dumping for three consecutive administrative review periods.
In order to meet this criterion, the ITA requires that a review be conducted only in the first
and third (or third and fifth) years, and that no dumping be found. ITA may revoke an order
even if a review is not requested in the second (or fourth) year, provided the foreign producer
sold the subject merchandise to the United States in "commercial quantities" during that
intervening period. Under previous regulations, the ITA would only revoke an order if a
respondent were able to show that it did not sell the subject merchandise at less than fair value
in three consecutive reviews.
39
Respondents may now defer a requested review for a year, absent any opposition, allowing
the ITA to conduct two reviews simultaneously. 4° A deferral would most likely take place on
the first review, in light of a pending court case on an issue that would recur in an administrative
review. Such deferral would spare a foreign producer the expense of a review, while preserving
for them the right to seek future revocation of an outstanding order. In addition, domestic
parties may request an inquiry into whether the antidumping duty has been "absorbed" by
the exporter, in the period falling between the first and second, or third and fourth anniversary
of an AD order.4'
With respect to the substantive issues of AD calculations, in determinations affecting "non-
market economies" (which, in recent practice, has predominantly affected China), the ITA
has codified a new method for calculating the labor rate portion of normal value that does
not distinguish between skilled and un-skilled labor or rely on a single surrogate country's labor
rates. Also, in developing the surrogate costs of production, the ITA will no longer rely on
publicly available published information (PAPI), but will look to any publicly available informa-
tion to determine surrogate costs.
38. Antidumping Duties; Countervailing Duties, 62 Fed. Reg. 27,296 (1997). Many of these rules have
already been implemented through the interim rules effectuating the terms of the URAA. See Antidumping Duties;
Countervailing Duties, 60 Fed. Reg. 25,130 (1995).
39. Antidumping Duties; Countervailing Duties, 62 Fed. Reg. 27,399 (1997) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R.
§ 351.222).
40. Id. at 27,393 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 351.213).
41. Id.
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With respect to normal price comparisons in regular market economy cases, the ITA deviated
from the position taken in its interim rules with respect to level of trade adjustments, codifying
the practice of the previous year and a half. The final rule applies a two-prong test, requiring
that a respondent who claims that an adjustment should be made for different levels of trade
between home market and U.S. price comparisons must show: (i) different "marketing stages
(or their equivalent)," and (ii) substantial differences in selling activities, in order to justify the
level of trade adjustment."
The ITA also codified its practice with respect to the allocation of expenses in claiming
adjustments to price. The URAA did not affect the law or the ITA's practice in this area, but
the ITA has acknowledged that regulatory guidance is necessary to effectuate greater certainty
and predictability. Under this new rule, a foreign producer must first establish that it would
not be feasible to report an expense or a price adjustment on a transaction specific basis. The
ITA recognizes that a party could attempt to alter its bookkeeping practices in a way that would
render impossible the tying of certain expenses or adjustments to particular sales. Feasibility will
turn on a party's ability to demonstrate that its accounting systems, the accounting practices
of the industry, and "the manner in which the expenses or price adjustments are incurred or
granted"43 make transaction specific reporting impossible. A party can anticipate that the ITA
will want to see copies of historical accounting records, which may predate the period being
reviewed, or look into computer generated account records that provide more detail than simple
managerial and financial reports. A party then must show that the allocation method used does
not result in any "distortions or inaccuracies,"44 in that the party must provide a sufficiently
detailed explanation of the allocation method used. Although acceptable methods are not
enumerated in the final rules, ITA did provide examples in the preamble; a method will be
considered distortive where the expenses or adjustments disproportionately affect merchandise
not within the scope of the investigation.45
G. AD AND CVD SUNSET REvIEws
Under the URAA, antidumping and countervailing duty orders must be revoked after five years
of application unless the revocation would likely lead to the continuation or recurrence of dumping
or a countervailable subsidy (as the case may be), and the continuation or recurrence of material
injury.4' There are special rules for the implementation of this provision with respect to orders
that were in effect when the WTO Agreement became effective in the United States on January
1, 1995 (transition orders).4 The ITA has until July 1, 1998 to begin the review of these orders,
and all reviews must be initiated for all transition orders byJanuary 1, 2000. On October 9th,
the ITA published a proposed schedule for review of transition orders.48 Under this schedule,
reviews for similar commodities will be initiated together regardless of the initial effective date of
the dumping order. As a result, some sunset reviews are scheduled to begin earlier than they may
have otherwise, and some reviews have been postponed. The substantive standards for sunset
reviews will be more clearly established as these reviews are conducted.
42. Id. at 27,414 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 351.412).
43. Antidumping Duties; Countervailing Duties, 62 Fed. Reg. 27,295, 27,347 (1997); see also, id. at 27,410
(to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(g)(3).
44. Id. at 27,410 (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 351.401).
45. Id.
46. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1675(c)(1) (West Supp. 1998).
47. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1675(c)(6) (West Supp. 1998).
48. Transition Orders: Schedule and Grouping of Five-year Reviews, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,686 (1997).
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II. Judicial Developments
A. THE HARBOR MAINTENANCE TAX
In June 1997 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the 1995 decision
of the U.S. Court of International Trade and held that the Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT)49
as applied to exports, violates the export clause of the U.S. Constitution.5 ° The Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit found that the HMT was a tax rather than a fee, because the amount
collected from exporters does not fairly approximate the value of the services provided (i.e.,
dredging, construction, and other expenses of maintaining the harbors for commercial traffic)."'
Additionally, since the HMT is calculated on the value of goods as they are loaded onto vessels
or delivered to carriers, it specifically applies to exports." The saga of the HMT is not over
as the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 31, 1997."3
There was also activity on the HMT as applied to imports. In Same Corporation v. United
States,54 the plaintiff argued that the surplus of funds in the HMT trust fund violated Congres-
sional intent, and therefore frustrated plaintiffs expectations as a taxpayer. The Court held,
however, that the plaintiff had not articulated a direct harm caused by an identifiable violation
of the statute and dismissed the case."
B. PENALTIES
This was an active year for court cases involving civil penalties. In United States v. Hitacbi
America, Ltd.,56 the Court of International Trade distinguished the various levels of culpability
under section 592 and applied the "aiding or abetting" provision of that statute to the negligent
acts of another." Although the opinion is dominated by facts that are more likely to appear in
aJohn Grisham novel than a customs caseS-including the destruction of potentially exculpatory
evidence by Customs officials-it contains several instructive points.
49. The HMT, created in the Comprehensive Water Resources Development Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
96-622, 100 Stat. 4082 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4461), imposes a 0.125% tax on the value of cargo imported
to or exported from a federally maintained port, as designated periodically by the Department of the Treasury.
50. U.S. Shoe Corp. v. United States, 114 F.3d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1997), affg 907 F. Supp. 408 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1995). The export clause to the Constitution provides: "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported
from any State." U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, d. 5.
51. U.S. Shoe Corp., 114 F.3d at 1572. Judge Mayer dissented, finding that the tax is a user fee intended
and structured by Congress to raise only enough revenue to maintain harbors, and the fact that the tax has raised
excess revenue does not convert it to a general tax. Id. at 1581.
52. The United States also argued that exporters challenging the constitutionality of the HMT were required
to file an administrative protest with Customs to secure jurisdiction in the Court of International Trade. The
Federal Circuit found the filing of a protest to be unnecessary because there is no protestable "decision" by
Customs. To the contrary, Customs passively collects the tax in the amounts calculated by the exporter. Without
a decision of some kind, there could be no protest. Id. at 1568-69. The importance of this decision goes to the
amount of the available recovery. A protest must be filed within ninety days of the challenged decision and,
therefore, the requirement of a protest would substantially reduce the government's potential refund liability. 19
U.S.C.A. § 1514(cX3) (West Supp. 1998).
53. United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 118 S. Ct. 361 (1997).
54. No. 97-103, 1998 WL 141789 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 26, 1998).
55. Id.
56. 964 F. Supp. 344 (1997).
57. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1592 (West Supp. 1998).
58. See Hitachi America, 964 F. Supp. at 358-59. The bulk of the opinion deals with a veritable soap opera
of facts; HA employees turning paid informants, in-house counsel breaching obligations of confidentiality and
the marriage and tax evasion of two informants. There is also considerable background on how HA officials
failed to heed advice (from one of the informants) to seek outside counsel and to make tenders relating to these
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The case arose out of an agreement between the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority
(MARTA) and Hitachi Japan (HJ) for the purchase of subway cars. HJ produced and sold the
cars to C.ItohJapan (CIJ) who, actingas a tradingcompany, would export them to Hitachi America
(HA). HA, the importer of record, and its joint venture partner, C.Itoh America (CIA), the banker,
would then sell the cars to MARTA. MARTA paid CIA in dollars; CIA paid CIJ in Japanese yen;
and CIJ paid HJ in yen. Both HJ and HA were defendants in this case.
The case specifically concerned the reporting and customs dutiability of two contractual
price adjustments: the Economic Price Adjustment (EPA), which required MARTA to pay
for any inflation in labor and materials, and the Monetary Value Adjustment (MVA), which
required MARTA to assume the risks associated with currency fluctuations by paying a fixed
amount of yen for foreign materials.
With respect to the dutiability of the MVA, the court noted that the invoice submitted
with the entry indicated a dollar amount due between HA and CIJ, but that CIA paid CIJ in
yen. Under Customs' internal guidelines, a contract invoiced in dollars but payable in yen, at
a fixed rate, is yen-denominated. Therefore, the court found that the contract was yen-
denominated and that the MVA was non-dutiable. In reporting otherwise, however, HA had
negligently and consistently understated the payment to the foreign seller.
The issue with respect to the EPA was whether HA was required to notify Customs of this
adjustment at the time of entry. Customs argued that HA was under an obligation to either:
(1) have the entries held open for correction and liquidation at the end of the contract; or
(2) deposit estimated duties, including the EPA, at the time of entry and seek a refund at the
end of the contract." HA, citing a single customs ruling,6° claimed that it was permissible to
delay disclosure until the full amount could be determined. The court found that HA had no
definitive notice as to the proper procedure, and therefore a penalty would violate HA's right
to due process.
Customs persuaded the court, however, that HA was negligent in its failure to report the
EPA as it was received.6 While Customs' informants breached their obligations to their employer
and delayed HA's making a disclosure and tender, HA's failure to heed the advice of its
compliance officer and in-house counsel, as well as its delay in seeking expert advice, supported
a finding of negligence.
The court found that HA's disclosure of the contract on the entries, discussions with Customs
regarding the contract, and allocation of funds for the payment of duties assessed on the value
of the EPA, supported a dismissal of the fraud daim."2 Customs had ample opportunity to
request the contract and there was no other evidence that HA intended to deprive the government
of revenue.63 Also, the questionable dutiability of the MVA, and the fact that CIA, and not
payments, as well as detail on how the government's witnesses conveniently changed their opinions on the eve
of trial and how Customs destroyed records of meetings with the importer. The reviewer with only passing
interest in the principles of customs law will nonetheless find this opinion an entertaining read.
59. See Hitacbi America, 964 F. Supp. at 36 1. This is one of the situations that is to be resolved using the
reconciliation prototype. See discussion infra, note 37.
60. See 18 Cust. B. & Dec. 1030, 1032 (1984).
61. Payments affecting the price of previously imported goods must be reported "at once," see 19 U.S.C.A.
§ 1485 (West Supp. 1998).
62. See Hitacbi America, 964 F. Supp. at 361-62, 367. The Court found that the information given to HA
executives with respect to the EPA should have put them on notice to investigate their obligation but that this
was not sufficient to prove fraud. Id.
63. Id. at 370. The Court held that the fraud statute only requires a showing of intent to violate the law
and not intent to deprive the government of revenue, but there is no finding of fraud under this standard. Id.
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HA, was knowledgeable about the payments to Japan, made fraud unlikely with respect to
the MVA.64
The court also declined to find that the defendants acted with gross negligence65 with respect
to the MVA, as even the government believed the contract to be dollar-denominated. With
respect to the EPA, Customs did not prove the commonality of declaring EPA payments, so
as to show recklessness on the part of HA.6
The court found that the statutory provision covering aiding or abetting requires a finding
that the party charged assisted or supported the negligence of another, by substantially assisting
in the conduct and failing to exercise reasonable care to determine whether the conduct was
negligent.67 Under this standard, HJ provided a "tremendous amount of assistance" to HA's
importing activity." HJ failed to exercise reasonable care when it did not undertake a legal
review of the issues, failed to inquire of CIA how payments were being sent to Japan, and
otherwise failed to ensure that duties were being paid properly.
In United States v. Ziegler Bolt and Parts Co. ,69 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
affirmed a Court of International Trade decision holding that personal jurisdiction cannot be
established by service on the defendant's outside counsel. Under Court of International Trade
Rule 4(c)(l)(C)(ii), service of a corporate defendant may be made on an officer, managing or
general agent, or any other agent authorized to receive service. In this case, the court found
no indication that the lawyer had express or implied authority to accept service, and that the
mere relationship between attorney and client does not confer authority to accept service.
Further, the court affirmed that the timely assertion of an affirmative defense based on the
invalid service was not waived by active defense of the case.
In Pentax Corp. v. Robinson,7" the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered the
interplay between the penalty and prior disclosure statutes and special duties imposed by Customs
for the failure to mark a product with its country of origin.7' Pentax had imported improperly
marked goods and made a prior disclosure to Customs of that fact without the deposit of the
liquidated penalty amount.72 Customs regulations state that the party making the disclosure
64. Id. at 371. The government's destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence also influenced the Court
against a finding of fraud. Id.
65. Id. at 374. Gross negligence is based on "willful, wanton, or reckless misconduct, or evidence of 'utter
lack of all care'." Id.
66. Id. at 371. The government's destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence also influenced the Court
against a finding of gross negligence. Id.
67. Id. at 377-78. In order to weed out innocent bystanders, such as customs brokers and freight forwarders,
the Court set out six factors for determining whether assistance has been "substantial": (1) the nature of the act
in which the defendant assisted; (2) the amount of assistance provided; (3) the defendant's presence during the
act; (4) the relationship between the defendant and the principal tortfeasor; (5) the defendant's state of mind;
and (6) the duration of the alleged aider's or abettor's involvement. Id.
68. Id. at 387. The two companies are parent and subsidiary, giving them a dose relationship; they conferred
about the entry documentation and HJ made budget allocations for the duty payments, including the duty payable
for the EPA. Id.
69. 111 F.3d 878, 880 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
70. 125 F.3d 1457, 1458-59 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
71. Under 19 U.S.C. § 1304, imported articles, unless exempted, must be marked with their country of
origin. Subsection (h) of 1304 provides for a 10 percent ad valorem duty to be assessed on goods not properly
marked.
72. Under 19 U.S.C. § 1592(c)(4)(B), an importer may choose to disclose to Customs the existence of a
violation. If the importer does so prior to or without knowledge of the commencement of a Customs investigation
into the matter and the violation results from negligence or gross negligence, any penalty assessed as a result of
the violation is limited to the interest on the duties, taxes and fees that should have been paid. The importer
making a prior disclosure in a negligence case must tender the unpaid lawful duties within 30 days of the disclosure.
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must also tender the "actual loss of duties,"" and define this loss, in part, as "the duties of
which the Government has been deprived by reason of the violation., 74 In reversing the Court
of International Trade's decision, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reasoned that,
unlike marking duties, lawful duties are those duties which the government would have received
but for the violation. As the government would not collect marking duties, but for the violation,
they need not be tendered in order to perfect a prior disdosure.
C. PROTESTS
Administrative protests were also an active area of litigation this year. In Castelazo & Associates
v. United States,75 the plaintiff protested the imposition of antidumping duties, as well as the
separately billed interest assessment. Customs partially approved the protests" and reliquidated
the entries with recalculated interest due. The importer then protested the interest assessed on
reliquidation. While Customs admitted that the interest was incorrectly assessed, the protest
was denied as untimely.77
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, reversing the Court of International Trade, was
unpersuaded by the plaintiff s argument that the interest protest was timely because the liquidation
was not "final" until the initial protest was decided. The court found that neither the regulations
nor the statute differentiated between "final" and "preliminary" liquidation. 7" Additionally, the
court found that since the amount of interest claimed was not at issue, the importer did not need
to wait until reliquidation to protest the charge. Since the protest was not timely filed, the court
lacked jurisdiction to remedy the (admittedly) wrongly assessed interest.
In United States v. Cherry Hill Textiles, Inc., 9 Customs liquidated an entry as dutiable more
than thirteen months after the importer made entry on a duty free basis. When the importer
refused to pay the liquidated duties, and did not timely protest the liquidation, the government
filed an enforcement action seeking the recovery of the assessed duties. The surety, relying on
United States v. Sherman & Sons Co. , argued that a protest is only necessary when the importer
wishes to challenge a liquidation, in court, for the recovery of excess duties, and does not apply
to government enforcement actions. The Federal Circuit, however, found Sherman to be limited
to cases in which the government alleges fraud after the date of liquidation.' Further, the
73. 19 C.F.R. § 162.74(h) (1997).
74. 19 C.F.R. § 162.71(a)(1) (1997).
75. 126 F.3d 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
76. Id. at 1460. It is unclear from the opinion whether the importer had filed a request to clarify the scope
of the order with the Department of Commerce, or whether the tape had already been excluded by Commerce
and Customs had inadvertently assessed antidumping duties.
77. 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(3) requires that protests be filed within ninety days of the challenged decision. If
there is no timely protest of a protestable decision, the U.S. Court of International Trade lacks jurisdiction to
hear any issue concerning the decision.
78. Liquidation is "the final computation or ascertainment of the duties or drawback accruing on an entry."
19 C.F.R. § 159.1 (1997).
79. 112 F.3d 1550, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
80. 237 U.S. 146 (1915) (holding that the importer is not required to protest a reliquidation based on a
finding of fraud because the government must prove fraud in court and not through administrative action).
81. The Federal Circuit also distinguished two of its own cases. The Court found that neither United States
v. Utex Int'l, Inc., 857 F.2d 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1988) nor St. Paul Fie & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 959
F.2d 960 (Fed. Cir. 1992), relate to questions of the payment of duties by the importer or its surety. Utex
addressed whether an importer must protest a claim for liquidated damages and St. Paul addressed whether a
surety needed to file a protest to be released from a bond as a result of the government's breach of the contract.
Utex, 857 F.2d at 1414; St. Paul, 959 F.2d at 964.
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legislative history to the current law, as well as a long line of cases82 under the predecessor
statute,8 indicates a congressional intent that parties exhaust administrative remedies in enforce-
ment actions. Lastly, the court found that the defendant's readingof the statute would encourage
importers to refuse to pay the duties until the government brings suit and then collaterally
challenge the liquidation.
All was not lost, however. The court found that the entry had been liquidated by operation
of law a year after the date of entry and the liquidation in the thirteenth month was of no
consequence.84 While a number of cases have held that an importer must protest an incorrect
liquidation to challenge it, 8 the court refused to require the importer to protest this "reliquida-
tion" when Customs had not asserted any statutory basis for the reliquidation.
In Koike Aronson, Inc. v. United States,86 the Court of International Trade considered whether
a protest was sufficiently detailed to be jurisdictionally sound. The protest objected to the
classification Customs assigned the merchandise but did not provide an alternative classification
or detail the nature of the objection. SeniorJudge Watson held that a protest must be "reasonably
calculated to direct the mind of Customs to the full nature of a specific claim." 7 This protest
did not meet that standard as it did not provide a preferred rate of duty or a preferred classification.
D. MISCELLANEOUS CASES
This year, the Court of International Trade examined whether the incorrect designation of
foreign trade zone (FTZ) status was a mistake of fact correctable under 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c)."8
Ford Motor Company imported parts into its foreign trade subzone for the production of
automobiles. Parts entered prior to zone admittance were dutiable at a rate of 3.3 percent,
and would be designated with privileged domestic (PD) status. Alternatively, parts admitted
into the FTZ under non-privileged foreign (NPF) status would be subject to the 2.6 percent
ad. vat duty rate if incorporated into automobiles, and 25 percent ad. vat if incorporated into
trucks.8" Ford claimed that it intended to admit the parts for automobiles under NPF status
and the parts for trucks under PD status, but accidentally admitted all parts under NPF status.
Consequently, Customs liquidated the entries for parts incorporated into trucks at 25 percent
ad vat., resulting in an excess of $ 5,000,000 in duty.9°
82. See, e.g., Westray v. United States, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 322, 329-30 (1873); United States v. Scbksinger, 14
F. 682, 685 (C.C.D. Mass. 1882),aff'd, 120U.S. 109(1887); and cases cited at Cberry Hill, 112 F.3dat 1552-53.
83. See Tariff Act of 1864, ch. 171, 13 Stat. 202, 214-15.
84. Entries that are not liquidated within one year are deemed liquidated as entered. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1504(a)
(West Supp. 1998).
85. See, e.g., Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F. 3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Omni U.S.A., Inc. v. United
States, 840 F.2d 912 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
86. No. 97-130, 1997 WL 589401, at *1 (Ct. Int'l Trade Sept. 16, 1997).
87. Id. at 2.
88. The statute provides: "Notwithstanding a valid protest was not filed, the Customs Service may, in
accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary, reliquidate an entry or reconciliation to correct-(l) a
clerical error, mistake of fact, or other inadvertence... not amounting to an error in the construction of a law,
adverse to the importer and manifest from the record or established by documentary evidence, in any entry,
liquidation, or other customs transaction, when the error, mistake, or inadvertence is brought to the attention
of the Customs Service within one year after the date of liquidation or exaction; ... " 19 U.S.C.A. § 1520(c)
(West Supp. 1998).
89. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 979 F. Supp. 874, 876 n.2. Alternatively, Ford could have obtained the
"PD rate" by admitting the parts into the zone under Privileged Foreign Status (PFS) but as a matter of policy,
Ford did not use PFS. Id.
90. Id. at 877-78.
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The court refused to apply § 1520(c) in this situation since Ford had not established a
mistake of fact. There was no evidence that Ford intended to enter the parts under PD status,
and the company had not paid the duties prior to zone admittance. Additionally, Ford had
not established the inventory and recordkeeping procedures required for maintaining goods in
two different statuses within the subzone. The court noted that the Ford personnel responsible
for declaring the goods' zone status were required to exercise more discretion than is required
of a clerk.
Ford also argued that, since it had not received notices suspending liquidation, these entries
had been deemed liquidated at the rate and amount of duty asserted at the time of entry."
The court found, however, that Ford's recordkeeping procedures were insufficient to overcome
the presumption of regularity and delivery associated with the government's preparation and
mailing of these notices."
Finally, this year the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined whether the
application of the interest provision of 19 U.S.C. § 15059' to goods entered before, but
liquidated after, the provision's effective date would constitute retroactive application of the
law.94 The court found that the interest charge was triggered by the liquidation of the entries
and not by the initial payment of estimated duties. The application of this statute, therefore,
while requiring reference to antecedent events, would not constitute a retroactive application
of the law.
91. See 19 U.S.C. § 150 4(a) (1994).
92. See AN. Deringer, Inc. v. United States, No. 92-02-00080, 1996 WL 467736, at *1, *7, *12. (Ct. Int'l
Trade, Aug. 13, 1996) (extensively examining Customs procedures and computer systems for the preparation
and mailing of notices and determining that it is appropriate to attach the presumption of regularity even though
the procedure is not direct proof that the extension notices were prepared or mailed).
93. This section, as amended by section 642 of the North American Free Trade Implementation Act, Pub.
L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057, provides that "[I]nterest assessed due to an underpayment of duties . . . shall
accrue, at a rate determined by the Secretary, from the date the importer of record is required to deposit estimated
duties . . . to the date of liquidation."
94. Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, 118 F.3d 749, 750 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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